On the Origins of Moral Knowledge

I am deeply troubled by one question. How do I know what I say or do is the morally correct thing? Although it is cliché, I am bothered by Hitler. How do I know that I am not Hitler? On the other hand, how do I know that I am not infinitely good? Because of what Hitler did, and it was so awful, and presumably he thought he was doing the right thing, how do I know whether or not I am also mistaken? From this example, it should be clear that moral knowledge about right and wrong is not just about me feeling correct or righteous, there is some element of externality to it, something beyond my subjective experience.

Just as I may never know whether I am Hitler or not, how do I know whether I am not racist, or sexist, or antisemitic, when people who are those things, rarely realize it?

            Right and wrong is not even determined by norms. Again, in Hitler’s Weimar Republic, some awful things became normal. But that did not make them right. In previous eras, slavery was normal, but now it is not. That does not mean that slavery is morally right.

Another possibility is that, “Might is right.” For example, because the Union won the Civil War, therefore the Union was right. Or because the Allies won World War II, therefore the Allies were right. And while sometimes the good side wins, not all the time. The Weimar Republic experienced some military success before being defeated, and the South put up a good fight in the Civil War. That does not make the Weimar Republic a little right because they had a little military success. Just as in the US invasion of Iraq, the US was quickly militarily victorious, but that did not make the US invasion correct.

So subjectivity, norms, and might are not the origins of moral rightness. By process of elimination, there is an element of externality, something eternal about moral rightness. President Abraham Lincoln said in his Cooper Union Speech, "Right is might," meaning moral correctness is might, and I agree with President Lincoln.